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Abstract
Quantum Cryptography is a rapidly developing field of research
that benefits from the properties of Quantum Mechanics in perform-
ing cryptographic tasks. Quantum walks are a powerful model for
quantum computation and very promising for quantum information
processing. In this paper, we present a quantum public-key crypto-
graphic system based on quantum walks. In particular, in the pro-
posed protocol the public key is given by a quantum state generated
by performing a quantum walk. We show that the protocol is se-
cure and analyze the complexity of public-key generation and encryp-
tion/decryption procedures.
Keywords: Quantum walks; Public-key cryptographic systems; Holevo
bound
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1 Introduction
Since the invention of writing, the need for secret/secure communication
resulted in the development of cryptography – the art of “hidden commu-
nication”. It started by using simple symbols as code words and evolved
to the stage where the security is based on various mathematical hardness
assumptions: a widely used RSA-based cryptographic system [1] relies on
the conjecture that factoring large numbers is not feasible using standard
computers, while the alternative lattice-based public-key cryptographic sys-
tem [2] is based on the assumed difficulty of the so-called “shortest and closest
vector problems” (also related to the well known P 6= NP conjecture [3]).
With the advent of quantum computation, and in particular after the dis-
covery of the celebrated Shor’s algorithm for factoring [4], the security of
most cryptographic systems currently in use became jeopardized and as a
consequence the need for new cryptographic systems resilient to quantum
adversaries arose. The above mentioned lattice-based cryptographic system
is resilient to particular quantum adversaries that execute Shor’s algorithm,
as its security is not based on the factoring problem; nevertheless, it does
rely on another mathematical assumption, thus leaving open the question
of whether it is more than just computationally secure. A completely dif-
ferent approach is the one that takes advantage of quantum mechanics and
assumes that both sender and receiver have access to a quantum computer.
The major advantage of this approach is that the security, rather than rely-
ing on mathematical/computational hardness assumptions, is now based on
the laws of quantum mechanics.
Quantum cryptography has been among hot subjects of research in the
last decades. It was firstly considered by Wiesner in the late sixties and early
seventies, who introduced the notions of quantum multiplexing and money
(which was only published a decade later, see [5]), and further developed
by Bennet and Brassard in their famous Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)
BB84 protocol [6]. Subsequently, Mayers showed the unconditional security
of BB84 protocol i.e., the security that is based on the laws of (quantum)
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physics (see [7]). Rapid development of experimental techniques resulted
in the implementation of QKD, see for example [8], and nowadays one can
even buy devices implementing it on the online market from Clavis QKD
Platform [9].
As an alternative to QKD, another way for two parties to communi-
cate privately has been developed, using quantum public-key cryptosystems:
in [10] the authors propose a scheme based on quantum trapdoor one-way
functions, and in [11] a system is presented whose security is based on (quan-
tum) computational indistinguishability of quantum states. More recently,
Nikolopoulos [12] presented a secure public-key cryptographic system based
on single-qubit rotations.
In this paper we propose a new quantum public-key cryptographic system
in which the public keys are quantum states generated by running a quantum
walk, rather than by performing single-qubit rotations, while the private key
consists of: (i) the quantum walk, (ii) the number of steps of the walk and
(iii) the initial state. Regarding the use of quantum walks in cryptography,
see for example the recent work by Yan et al [13].
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we start with basic
definitions and notation used throughout the paper. In Section 3 we present
our public-key cryptographic system and discuss its security and efficiency. In
Section 4 we summarize the results obtained and point some future research
direction.
2 Quantum walks
The concept of random walk was introduced to describe the behavior of a
“walker” over a path who, at each step, can choose to follow one of the pos-
sible directions with a certain a priori fixed probability. It was shown to
be very useful in computer science (sampling massive online graphs, image
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segmentation, estimating the size of the World Wide Web, wireless network-
ing, etc.), physics (modeling the Brownian motion, studying polymers, etc.),
and many other fields of research (financial economics, medicine and biology,
psychology, etc.).
Quantum walks are the quantum counterpart of random walks and were
first considered in [14]. Unlike the classical case, in which the state of the
walker is described by a probability distribution over the allowed positions,
in the quantum scenario the state of the walker is given by a superposition
of positions. Quantum walks are a successful tool in algorithmic theory since
they provide an exponential speedup over classical computations for several
oracular problems [15, 16, 17] and polynomial speedup for many important
classical solutions of problems such as determining whether all the elements
of a list are distinct [18], and in search problems in general [19]. Moreover,
they are an important computational primitive, since they permit universal
quantum computation [20, 21]. For practical implementations, see for exam-
ple the recent book [22]. One can study different types of quantum walks,
determined by their time evolution (discrete- vs continuous-time), underlying
position space and their topology (walks on the line, lattice, circle, graphs,
etc.). In this work we use discrete-time quantum walks on the circle.
2.1 One-dimensional discrete-time quantum walks
2.1.1 Basic dynamics
In a discrete-time quantum walk on an infinite line, we consider the movement
of a walker along discrete positions on it, labeled i ∈ Z. At each step the
particle moves to the left or to the right, depending on the state of the internal
degree of freedom, commonly called the coin state. The position and the coin
state of the particle are from the Hilbert spaces Hp = span{|i〉 : i ∈ Z} and
Hc = span{|R〉 , |L〉}, respectively.
The evolution of the system at each step of the walk is described by the
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unitary operator:
Uˆ = Sˆ
(
Iˆp ⊗ Uˆc
)
. (1)
In the above expression Iˆp is the identity operator on Hp, Sˆ is the shift
operator
Sˆ =
∑
i∈Z
(|i+ 1〉 〈i| ⊗ |R〉 〈R|+ |i− 1〉 〈i| ⊗ |L〉 〈L|) , (2)
and Uˆc ∈ U(2) is the coin operator acting on Hc. The general expression for
Uˆc is:
Uˆc = Uˆc(θ, ξ, ζ) =
[
eiξ cos θ eiζ sin θ
−e−iζ sin θ e−iξ cos θ
]
. (3)
2.1.2 Shift operator on the circle
To simulate the walk on a circle, one could either identify positions −N
and N of the above discussed line, or connect the two, thus altering the
corresponding shift operator. In the former, the circle has an even number of
positions (2N), while in the latter it has an odd number of positions (2N+1).
Without loss of generality, we consider the position Hilbert space Hp =
span{|i〉 : i ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}}. The general expression for a shift operator
on a circle with N positions is:
Sˆ =
N−1∑
i=0
(
|i+ 1 (mod N)〉 〈i| ⊗ |R〉 〈R|
+ |i− 1 (mod N)〉 〈i| ⊗ |L〉 〈L|
)
(4)
= Tˆ1 ⊗ |R〉 〈R|+ Tˆ−1 ⊗ |L〉 〈L|
where
Tˆm =
N−1∑
i=0
|i+m (mod N)〉 〈i| (5)
is the m−position translation operator.
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3 Public-key encryption based on discrete-
time quantum walks
We now present the public-key cryptographic system using quantum walks
on a circle. To generate the public key, we use a discrete number of possible
walks Uˆk = Sˆ[Iˆ ⊗ Uˆc(θk, ξk, ζk)], with θk = ξk = ζk = k
2pi
d
, k ∈ I =
{1, 2, . . . , d} and d ∈ N.
Protocol 1 (Public-key encryption scheme).
Inputs for the protocol
• Message to transfer:
m ∈ {0, . . . , 2n − 1}, i.e., a message of at most n bits;
• Secret key SK = (Uˆk, t, l) where:
Uˆk with k ∈ I = {1, 2, . . . , d}, t ∈ T = {t0, . . . , tmax} ⊂ N and
l ∈ {0, . . . , 2n − 1}.
Public-key generation
• Alice chooses uniformly at random l ∈ {0, . . . , 2n − 1} and s ∈
{L,R}, and generates the initial state |l〉 |s〉;
• Then she chooses, also uniformly at random, the walk Uˆk = Sˆ(Iˆp⊗
Uˆc) and the number of steps t ∈ T ;
• Finally, she generates the public key:
|ψPK〉 = Uˆ
t
k |l〉 |s〉 =
[
Sˆ(Iˆp ⊗ Uˆc)
]t
|l〉 |s〉 . (6)
Message Encryption
• Bob obtains Alice’s public key |ψPK〉;
• He encrypts m by applying spatial translation to obtain:
|ψ(m)〉 = (Tˆm ⊗ Iˆc) |ψPK〉 ; (7)
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• Bob sends |ψ(m)〉 to Alice.
Message Decryption
• Alice applies Uˆ−tk to the state |ψ(m)〉;
• She performs the measurement
Mˆ =
∑
i
|i〉 〈i| ⊗ Iˆc (8)
and obtains the result m′. The message sent by Bob is m = m′ − l
(mod N).
3.1 Correctness of the protocol
Proposition 1. The above protocol is correct, in the sense that if Alice and
Bob follow it, and no third party intervenes during its execution, at the end of
the decryption phase Alice recovers the message sent by Bob with probability
1.
Proof. The correctness of the protocol when Alice and Bob follow the pre-
scribed steps is a direct consequence of the fact that the quantum walk Uˆ tk
commutes with any translation Tˆm. Thus, the state of the system before the
final step of the decryption phase (measurement), is:
|ψf〉 = Uˆ
−t
k |ψ(m)〉
= Uˆ−tk (Tˆm ⊗ Iˆc)Uˆ
t
k |l〉 |s〉 (9)
= (Tˆm ⊗ Iˆc) |l〉 |s〉
= |l +m (mod N)〉 |s〉 .
Hence, upon measuring Mˆ and obtaining m′ = l + m(mod N), the last
modular operation performed in the last step of the Message Decryption
reveals that the decrypted message is indeed m.
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In the previous Proposition the crucial point is the fact that the quantum
walk commutes with the translation. Below, we prove in detail that Uˆ tk and
(Tˆm ⊗ Iˆc) commute.
Lemma 1. Let N ≥ 2n where n is a fixed integer. Let Uˆ tk be a quantum walk
from Protocol 1 and let Tˆm denote the translation operator for m positions
modulo N . Then Uˆ tk and (Tˆm ⊗ Iˆc) commute.
Proof. Notice that the action of any Uˆk used in Protocol 1 can be written as:
Uˆk |l〉 |s〉 = αL(s) |l − 1〉 |L〉+ αR(s) |l + 1〉 |R〉 , (10)
where |L〉 and |R〉 are the orthogonal coin states and αL/R(s) is the probability
amplitude to find the walker in position l− 1 or l+1, depending on its spin.
Notice also that Tˆm is defined as:
Tˆm |l〉 = |l +m (mod N)〉 . (11)
Then, for any element of the form |l〉 |s〉 we have:
(Tˆm ⊗ Iˆc)Uˆk |l〉 |s〉 = (Tˆm ⊗ Iˆc)[αL(s) |l − 1〉 |L〉 + αR(s) |l + 1〉 |R〉]
= αL(s) |l − 1 +m (mod N)〉 |L〉 (12)
+αR(s) |l + 1 +m (mod N)〉 |R〉 .
On the other hand, we also have:
Uˆk(Tˆm ⊗ Iˆc) |l〉 |s〉 = Uˆk |l +m (mod N)〉 |s〉
= αL(s) |l − 1 +m (mod N)〉 |L〉 (13)
+αR(s) |l + 1 +m (mod N)〉 |R〉 .
Observe that this lemma can be extended to more general shift opera-
tions, which allow jumps for two or more positions, or leave position state
unchanged, depending on the coin state.
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3.2 Security of the protocol
The protocol consists of two phases. In the first, Alice sends a public key
|ψPK〉 to Bob. In the second, upon encrypting the message m, Bob sends
back the state |ψ(m)〉 to Alice. Therefore, one has to show the security of
the secret key during the first phase and the security of the message during
the second phase.
Our proof of the security is based on Holevo’s Theorem, that bounds the
amount of classical information that an eavesdropper can retrieve from a
given quantum mixed state by means of a POVM measurement.
Let us denote by ρˆPK the mixed state of the public key, as perceived by
Eve, who does not know a priori the secret key SK chosen by Alice. Even
if Eve were to know Uˆk and t, ρˆPK is completely mixed:
ρˆPK = Uˆ
t
k

 1
2n+1
2n−1∑
l=0
∑
s∈{L,R}
|l〉 〈l| ⊗ |s〉 〈s|

 (Uˆ tk)†
= Uˆ tk
(
1
2n+1
Iˆp ⊗ Iˆc
)
(Uˆ tk)
† (14)
=
1
2n+1
Iˆp ⊗ Iˆc.
Assuming that Eve performs a measurement on ρˆPK , Holevo’s Theorem im-
plies that the mutual information I(SK,E) between the secret key SK and
her inference E is bounded from above by the Von Neumann entropy of this
state:
I(SK,E) ≤ S(ρˆPK) = −Tr(ρˆPK log ρˆPK) = n+ 1. (15)
To conclude that the protocol is secure we have to show that the mutual
information is very small compared to the Shannon entropy of the secret key.
Indeed, the Shannon entropy of the secret key depends on the probability to
choose Uˆk, t and the initial state |l〉 |s〉. In the following we denote by pk the
probability to choose Uˆk from the set
{
Uˆk|k ∈ I = {1, 2, . . . , d}
}
, by pt the
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probability to run the walk for t steps, with t ∈ T = {t0, . . . , tmax}, and by pl,s
the probability to choose |l〉 |s〉 as the initial state, where l ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2n −
1} and s ∈ {L,R}. Since this choices are random and independent, the
probability of a certain secret key SK is given by:
pSK = pk pt pl,s =
1
d |T | 2n+1
, (16)
where |T | is the cardinality of T .
The above probability distributions are uniform, so the Shannon entropy
of the secret key is:
H(pSK) = −
∑
k∈I
∑
t∈T
2n−1∑
l=0
∑
s∈{L,R}
pk pt pl,s log2(pk pt pl,s)
= log2(d |T | 2
n+1) (17)
= log2(d |T |) + n+ 1.
Thus, we have:
I(SK,E) ≤ S(ρˆPK) < H(pSK). (18)
With the appropriate choice of |T | and d, e.g., |T |, log d ≈ poly(n), for
sufficiently large n, the Shannon entropy of the secret key has a polynomial
overhead over the von Neumann entropy of the public key as seen by Eve,
H(pSK)− S(ρˆPK) = log2(d |T |) ≈ poly(n). (19)
This way, upon obtaining the maximal possible information about the secret
key, given by S(ρˆPK), Eve’s uncertainty (in the number of bits) of the SK is
still polynomial in n, i.e., the number of keys consistent with the information
she has is exponential in n. We note that the choice of d ≈ exp(n) secures
the secrecy of the encrypted message, while |T | ≈ poly(n) was chosen to
maintain the protocol’s efficiency, discussed in the next section.
For the rest of this section we discuss the security of the message m during
the second phase of the protocol, when Bob sends the encrypted message
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|ψ(m)〉 = (Tˆm ⊗ Iˆc) |ψPK〉 to Alice. Without knowing the secret key, the
state perceived by Eve is still a complete mixture:
ρˆE = (Tˆm ⊗ Iˆc)
(
1
2n+1
Iˆp ⊗ Iˆc
)
(Tˆm ⊗ Iˆc)
† =
1
2n+1
Iˆp ⊗ Iˆc. (20)
The most that Eve can learn is the very quantum state |ψ(m)〉 (although,
as proven above, even that is impossible, unless with negligible probability).
Nevertheless, without knowing the secret key, this information is not enough
for Eve to infer the message encrypted by Bob. This is a simple consequence
of the fact that for each allowed encryption state, there exists a suitably
chosen secret key that can decrypt any message m. Indeed, a state |ψ(m)〉
that for the secret key SK = (Uˆk, t, l) corresponds to the message m, for the
secret key SK ′ = (Uˆk, t, l −∆l) corresponds to the message m+∆l (below,
the subscripts SK and SK ′ explicitly denote the secret key used to encrypt
the corresponding messages m and m+∆l, respectively):
|ψ(m)〉SK = (Tˆm ⊗ Iˆc) |ψPK〉
= (Tˆm ⊗ Iˆc)Uˆ
t
k(Tˆ∆l ⊗ Iˆc) |l −∆l〉 |s〉 (21)
= (Tˆm+∆l ⊗ Iˆc)Uˆ
t
k |l −∆l〉 |s〉
= |ψ(m+∆l)〉SK ′ .
3.3 Efficiency of the protocol
In this section we show the efficiency of the proposed protocol, i.e. the overall
time τ required for its execution (public-key generation, message encryption
and message decryption) scales polynomially with the length n of the mes-
sage.
The public-key generation as well as the message decryption are efficient
procedures, since the quantum walks used to perform them are efficient.
Indeed, denoting by ∆τw the time required for a single step Uˆ of the walk,
the full walk Uˆ t is completed in time τ = t ·∆τw. In the previous section we
took t ≈ poly(n) for security purposes, a choice which is also adequate for
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the efficiency of the quantum walk: the time required to perform the walk is
polynomial in n.
In addition to this, for the overall protocol to be efficient, the message
encryption, given by the translation operator Tˆm, has to be efficient as well.
It might seem at first that the encryption of the message is not efficient, as
it requires O(2n) single-position translations, Tˆm = (Tˆ1)
m. Below, we show
that this is not necessarily a non-efficient procedure, i.e., various practical
implementations of Tˆm are indeed efficient.
In case the system that performs the quantum walk consists of n + 1
qubits (n carrying the position of the walker plus the coin one), such that
the states of the computational basis encode different positions (see for ex-
ample [23]), the translation operator Tˆm is nothing but the addition by m,
which is an efficient operation for a quantum computer. Alternatively, in
those cases of physical realizations in which different position states |i〉 are
given by distinct spatial positions (see for example implementations based
on integrated photonics [24]), Bob can simply re-label the positions on the
device that carries the quantum state of the public key, i.e. i→ i−m, which
is also efficient, as he can do it in parallel at the same time for all position
states.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we presented a quantum public-key cryptographic system based
on quantum walks. Unlike the recently proposed protocol [12] that uses
single-qubit rotations to generate the public key, in our scheme the execution
of a quantum walk, in general, results in entangled quantum states as public
keys, thus increasing the practical security of our scheme (an eavesdropper
has to, in general, perform more complex operations to extract information
from entangled rather than from product states). Using Holevo’s theorem,
we proved the protocol’s security. We also analyzed the complexity of our
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public-key generation and message encryption/decryption and showed their
efficiency, i.e., that the complexity of our protocol scales polynomially with
the size of the message.
Future research includes designing other security protocols based on the
use of quantum walks, such as oblivious transfer (along the lines of the re-
cently proposed protocol presented in [25]), commitment schemes and other
privacy functionalities.
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